Update loyalty systems.md
This commit is contained in:
several-D
GitHub
parent
087d608658
commit
210453c2b0
|
|
@ -1 +1,223 @@
|
|||
**SYSTEMS OF LIABILITY**
|
||||
|
||||
The project explores the colonial nature of relations between russia and post-soviet countries, using the example of the formation of military logistics networks for russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine (2022).
|
||||
|
||||
**General content:**
|
||||
|
||||
text
|
||||
|
||||
video and transcript
|
||||
|
||||
map
|
||||
|
||||
**Text content:**
|
||||
|
||||
loyalty systems.
|
||||
|
||||
russian imports in numbers.
|
||||
|
||||
the list of countries.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
What do we see on the arms and components supply map?
|
||||
|
||||
Erased borders.
|
||||
|
||||
Hybrid regimes of map blurring by transnational capitals and neocolonial logics of subordination.
|
||||
|
||||
Flexible modulation of transnational military contractors' command networks in a state of permanent war.
|
||||
|
||||
Networks of a global empire of military concerns and their cross-national connectedness.
|
||||
|
||||
Networks materialize their boundaries through the detailing of connections, names, addresses, and nuanced logistics.
|
||||
|
||||
The network should be treated as a process and technology with algorithms of action but not as an object.
|
||||
|
||||
A worldwide war condition blurs the distinction between war and non-war, where "war becomes the basic principle of the organization of social life, and politics is only one of its instruments or embodiments" (A. Negri, M. Hardt "Empire").
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Despite the apparent political autonomy of neighboring countries (former Soviet countries: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Moldova, etc.), russia continues to use its territorial neighbors as a transit zone to bypass the blockage of supplies of components for the military-industrial complex. The borders of sovereign territories are being re-drawn under the pressure of the diffuse space of the russian network of military contractors. Corrupt bypass routes for shadow imports become active and visible.
|
||||
|
||||
Shadow imports are necessary for russia to continue to replenish stocks and service the military-industrial complex.
|
||||
|
||||
The russian military-industrial complex is not independent and critically depends on imported components.
|
||||
|
||||
This is especially true for UAVs, secure communications, microelectronics, and machine tools for manufacturing parts.
|
||||
|
||||
The russian military-industrial complex is a direct successor of the soviet one. Over the past 30 years, very few new weapons have been put into serial production. The main focus of the russian military-industrial complex is on repair, support for the first, and modernization of what was produced during the USSR era. The new weapons samples under the russian outer shell consist of Western components at the level of engines, optics, processors, and microelectronics.
|
||||
|
||||
Contrary to myths about the impressive legacy of the soviet union, its own developments, and military production capacities, the russian military-industrial complex is a poorly coordinated, corrupt, and non-independent network of half-destroyed research institutes of the soviet period. Places, where import substitution of microelectronics and production methods takes place only on podiums in front of investors and in the weak imagination of officials, not existing in reality, the dynamics of the microelectronics industry and russian developments can be traced on the archived pages of the plant of Angstrem JSC ( moscow company engaged in the design and manufacture of electronic products and semiconductors. The company produced a number of Soviet-era integrated schemes. After the collapse of the USSR in the 90s, it produced a line of calculators and bank cards.) The plant, which was founded in 1963 under the name NII-336, and like the entire russian microelectronics industry, rapidly deteriorated after the collapse of the USSR 2.
|
||||
|
||||
2010: "The government will keep foreign parts out of defense products, cryptography, and passport systems To support russian microelectronics, the government agreed to provide local companies with orders, even if their products are more expensive than their foreign counterparts The government will support russian microelectronics" (c).
|
||||
|
||||
2010: "It makes no sense to create capacities for mass production of consumer electronics and electronic components with a low intellectual component, as the technological lag from the world leaders - the USA, Japan, Asia - is too great. There is nothing terrible in the fact that russia will continue to import from abroad electronics of mass demand - household appliances, TV sets, cell phones, GLONASS navigators, bank and trade cards, and other "colonial" goods (or to produce abroad for domestic consumption, but based on russian developments) - this is what all countries do today" (c).
|
||||
|
||||
2011: "Angstrem" started selling Huawei equipment.”
|
||||
|
||||
2011: "Vnesheconombank renewed Angstrem-T's credit line for 815 million euros. Former Communications Minister Leonid Reiman may have helped Angstrem-T reach an agreement with the bank.
|
||||
|
||||
Vnesheconombank's Supervisory Board has approved the resumption of financing for Angstrem-T, a source close to the Board told Vedomosti. The matter concerns a credit line for 815 million euros, which the bank allocated to this company in 2008 for the purchase of AMD licenses and equipment, as well as for the launch of a 0.13-0.11 micrometer microchip plant." (с)
|
||||
2018: "U.S. sanctions targeting russia's nascent high-tech industry have caused a russian microchip company significant financial problems and delayed the launch of an initiative aimed at producing substitutes for Western products, the firm's owner said." President Vladimir Putin has emphasized the need to develop a domestic technology industry in russia to make it less dependent on Western equipment. But Moscow's efforts to produce russian microchips and other high-tech products have been hampered by U.S. sanctions against a number of russian technology companies. Angstrem-T, which makes semiconductors, has accumulated significant debts and is about to be taken over by state development bank VEB after failing to repay an 815 million euro loan."(c)
|
||||
|
||||
2019 Bankruptcy.
|
||||
|
||||
2023 Angstrem is placed under state management under the decree on the state defense order, enters with GC Element, a joint venture between Rostekh and AFK Sistema, and Angstrem-T goes under the control of the state-owned VEB.RF corporation
|
||||
|
||||
2023 disassembly into components by Ukrainian military experts: "Rashistka radio #Azart manufactured by #Angstrom. The radio contains five key #AnalogDevices chips." (c)
|
||||
|
||||
What do we learn here about the global supply of components for the military-industrial complex, except about the helplessness and collapse of russia's domestic microelectronics industry? The US imposed sanctions on Angstrem-T in 2016 for the annexation of Crimea in 2014, but in 2023, Angstrem-T will use microchips made in the US.
|
||||
|
||||
These details are also important because the Azart radio, assembled by Angstrem, is part of the Lorandit RP-377LR (radio-electronic reconnaissance) and REB (radio-electronic warfare) system, which is used in the war against Ukraine. That's being used in the war against Ukraine. RER and REB play key roles in combat, as they read UAV signals and interfere with the piloting course of enemy UAVs. That is, we realize that russian radio surveillance and radio warfare equipment are not without Western and Chinese manufacturers. At the same time, neither the U.S. nor the European countries provide lend-lease and aid to Ukraine.
|
||||
|
||||
russia does not have an extensive network of contractors for the military industry. Orders are distributed non-transparently within large holdings and corporations. Control over the fulfillment of orders is also hidden deep in the gut of an opaque but poorly coordinated machine. Since 2014, a network of foreign intermediary firms was registered and set up to supply components for the production of weapons. They, in turn, sent chips, microchips, etc., to military contractors - subsidiaries of the russian military-industrial complex, whose main enterprises were already under sanctions.
|
||||
|
||||
The sanctions boycott policies adopted in 2022 (and earlier in 2014) by the EU and a number of other countries no longer allow russia to obtain resources for direct warfare. However, the effect of sanctions 3 on military technology is severely weakened by the time lag, the merging of civilian and military technologies, and the enforced loyalty of the buffer countries that russia uses. Most importantly, russia continues to obtain components through old corrupt "business as a usual" relationships in European countries.
|
||||
|
||||
Some military logistics have been restructured to focus on production in Iran, China, and Turkey. However, Western components produced in the EU and the U.S. enter russia via Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan.
|
||||
Such cooperation and assistance in circumventing sanctions can hardly be called voluntary for the countries of the former USSR that share common borders with russia.
|
||||
|
||||
Human resources also play an important role in the colonial logic of warfare. Taking advantage of the pressure on the former soviet republics, russia promises russian passports to migrant workers from Central Asia for their participation in the war. In 2023, russia roundups and police raids on migrants who have obtained russian passports to serve them as military conscripts. External colonial logics are reflected in domestic politics: most of russia's army is made up of indigenous peoples, residents of national republics, and contract soldiers from economically disadvantaged regions. In Alabuga (Tatarstan), 15-year-olds are forcibly recruited to assemble Iranian Shahed combat drones for the needs of the russia army. The ideas of the "russian world" are paid for by those who were consistently exploited by the central regions and experienced genocides and ethnic cleansing by the empire.
|
||||
|
||||
We want to emphasize that the post-Soviet countries are deliberately used by russia, as the dependent quality of relations does not create conditions for symmetrical choices or the possibility of autonomous decision-making. In the example of Sakartvelo it is easy to trace the links of colonial pressure. Suffering 20% occupation of its territories by russia, Sakartvelo does not join the EU sanctions demands, despite the high level of internal solidarity of Sakartvelo residents towards Ukraine's struggle and despite the fact that Sakartvelo became a candidate for EU accession in 2023. There are many reasons for these apparent contradictions (threat of military intervention from russia, old corrupt ties between the countries, forced cross-border cooperation, transit deals, etc).
|
||||
|
||||
Also, the fact that many countries of post-soviet territories are linked to russia by forced labor migration plays a role in dependency relations. Migrant families are fragmented by labor-trade relations and forced linguistic-cultural integration in russia. And russian exploitative logics is the reason for this migration. Financial, scientific, educational, and cultural resources have been concentrated around the center ( moscow) without strengthening and developing local infrastructures, which makes people migrate for the missing flows in search of work, education, health care and better quality of life. The logics of capital and colonialism follow symmetrically, supporting each other.
|
||||
|
||||
Since the beginning of russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the borders of post-Soviet countries have been experiencing unrest and anxiety. Tensions have materialized into border military conflicts (Tajikistan-Uzbekistan, Armenia-Azerbaijan) and mass rallies demanding local authorities stop flirting with the Kremlin. (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Moldova).
|
||||
Through external agents of influence, russia pressures and interferes in local elections, sabotaging paid rallies and riots. It threatens with economic pressure and cutting off access to energy resources, forcing neighboring countries into political deals loyal to itself.
|
||||
|
||||
We see diffraction and plurality in the ideas of territorial independence and state sovereignty. Logistic flows furrow and redraw political and geographical maps, subjugating new territories and redefining them. The economic dependence and connectedness of the post-soviet space with the kremlin's central apparatus, subordinates the regional territories of russia in the logic of resource economy and encroaches on the fragile borders with neighboring states. Moscow is becoming a liquid and sticky matter, expanding its presence and extending its spheres of influence into more vulnerable regions on geographic or economic grounds.
|
||||
|
||||
There can be no equal and secure relationship with a government that looks at a neighboring independent state as a temporarily neglected territory and does not see it as a subject of its own history. On the other hand, russia looks at the former republics in a revanchist and, at the same time, condescending way. The histories of external and internal colonial conquests, genocides, and deportations in tsarist russia, the russian empire, and modern russia are still covered with Bolshevik myths of equality and friendship of peoples and false oppositions to Western imperialism.
|
||||
|
||||
What is the purpose of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by russia? A war to establish or maintain a social order may not have an end. Therefore, it involves constant, unremitting use of violence and cruelty. It cannot be won, or, more precisely, it has to be won over and over again daily. We are looking at a policy of consistent genocide and destruction of the culture of a former USSR republic that has disassociated itself from the xenophobic narratives of the "russian world.”
|
||||
|
||||
Russia is not interested in new territories from the point of view of their local development. (this can be traced back to the occupation of Abkhazia and the subsequent abandonment of the territories). At the same time as new territories of Ukraine are being seized, the regions of russia are rotting, numerically and economically dying out, being an exploitative and reproductive zone for the center ( moscow).
|
||||
|
||||
Russia does not hesitate to make temporary making to obtain weapons and organize gray oil searching for totalitarian governments such as Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan helps circumvent sanctions on oil and gas sales to the EU by being a hub/redistribution zone and giving russian gas and oil products for Azerbaijan's oil and gas exports. Iran and Turkey are suppliers of drones, which are then passed off as locally produced by the russia (e.g. Geranium drones used in the war with Ukraine).
|
||||
|
||||
Also, russia supports and legitimizes such terrorist groups as Hamas (Palestine), Taliban (Afghanistan) and expands its presence in Africa by participating in local military coups.
|
||||
Analysis of the schemes and channels of supply of components for the russian military-industrial complex reveals many countries involved, in addition to the former soviet republics. russia continues to receive all necessary dual-use goods and critical elements for weapons production. China, Turkey, and Iran are also significant partners. Having developed and joined the sanctions, western European countries and the U.S. are forced not to sell parts directly, but this still does not prevent the delivery of components to russia.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Many Western companies do not answer journalists' questions about export conditions of release and how to control the use of their products.
|
||||
|
||||
At the moment, we see stable supply networks on the map that help circumvent sanctions controls. And if, in the case of post-soviet countries, in many respects, we can understand the situation of non-choice, then the loyalty and rigidity of the rest of the countries: the UK, the USA, and Western European countries (France, Germany, Austria, Switzerland) - raise questions.
|
||||
Questions about the boundaries of expansion and the speed of geopolitical capital military-industrial geopolitical capital.
|
||||
|
||||
It is not the sanctions that work poorly but their adoption mechanisms and consistent enforcement procedures.
|
||||
|
||||
"The key condition that defines an ontological policy is its execution (performance)." Ann Marie Moll
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
**Footnotes:**
|
||||
|
||||
1.
|
||||
*X-101 missile - at least 53 types of electronic component bases (microchips, chips) are foreign-made. In particular, components from such companies as STMicroelectronics (Switzerland), Vicor (USA), XILINX (USA), Intel Corporation (USA), Texas Instruments (USA), ZILOG (USA), Maxim Integrated (USA) and Cypress Semiconductor (USA).
|
||||
Russia uses at least 45 foreign components to produce 3M-14 Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles. The 9M723 ballistic missiles and 9M728/9M729 cruise missiles of the Iskander complex are equipped with at least 15 and 32 types of foreign electronic component bases (ECB), respectively. At least 48 foreign components are used in the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles.
|
||||
A chip made by the world-famous American company Intel was found in the russian Tornado-S missile, particularly in the head section
|
||||
In August 2022, the UK's Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), also examining russian missiles, found that russian weapons are critically dependent on Western electronics. Of 450 unique foreign-made components, more than a quarter bore the logo of Texas Instruments and Analog Devices, two American companies.*
|
||||
|
||||
*In the first seven months of the war, russia imported $2.6 billion worth of electronic components, at least $777 million of which were manufactured by Western firms, according to a joint investigation by RUSI (Royal United Services Institute) and Reuters based on russian customs data.
|
||||
Allegedly "household" chips worth about $3 billion entered russia in 2022
|
||||
https://www.liga.net/politics/articles/zapadnye-tehnogiganty-pomogayut-rossii-bombit-ukrainskie-goroda-kak-eto-ostanovit*
|
||||
|
||||
2
|
||||
|
||||
*https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angstrem_(company) AO Angstrem is a moscow-based company engaged in the company engaged in the development and manufacturing of electronic products and semiconductors.
|
||||
The company manufactured a number of soviet era integrated circuits. After the collapse of the soviet union, it produced a line of calculators and bank cards in the 1990s.*
|
||||
|
||||
*https://www.linkedin.com/posts/alexey-evstifeev-9288b829_азарт-ангстрем-analogdevices-activity-7130575077061869568-5zz- 2023: radiostation #Azart viroiznizstvo #Angstrem, Radiostation contains p'yat key microchips #AnalogDevices.
|
||||
U.S. sanctions targeting russia's nascent high-tech industry have caused the russian microchip company significant financial problems and delayed the launch of an initiative aimed at producing substitutes for Western products, the firm's owner said.*
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
**NETWORK /video transcript/**
|
||||
|
||||
the text of the video uses quotes from AMBIENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS Luksch/Patel, and the full book is available here
|
||||
|
||||
http://www.ambienttv.net/love
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
"We're swimming in a materialized stream of data -
|
||||
or, more accurately, since this data
|
||||
already interpreted and pre-processed,
|
||||
we are drowning in (un)information.
|
||||
Before
|
||||
"intelligence reports can be analyzed,
|
||||
war has already broken out on the other side of the Earth.
|
||||
|
||||
However, the scope
|
||||
of individual action is becoming more and more
|
||||
limited.
|
||||
Voting and consumer
|
||||
policies are strictly limited tools." ATV
|
||||
|
||||
info-techno capitalism, blurred lines between military and civilian technologies, hydrocarbon deals, it's just business, "for our children,” I'm just looking at violence, escort subsidy, digitized migrant footprints - the new Babylon.
|
||||
Networks put an end to postmodernism and the helpless hum of abstraction.
|
||||
|
||||
Networks can replace postmodernist
|
||||
relativism with data analytics, eliminating disorientation.
|
||||
traps, dead ends, and mirror halls are also fields
|
||||
and spheres for intervention.
|
||||
|
||||
Understanding networks as biotechnology allows for co-authorship and racialization. taking ontological instability as a given, we can look at ways of constructing and playing with networks as visualizations of the ideas of new materialisms.
|
||||
The network is more than a "topology of nodes in space" but rather a matter of affects, fluid entities, at once
|
||||
human and non-human,
|
||||
cultural and technological.
|
||||
|
||||
and if it is through the node that the network materializes its boundaries, we can influence and reconfigure the algorithms of its construction.
|
||||
|
||||
how many engineers and scientists work indirectly or directly for military research?
|
||||
|
||||
The network slices, stitches, fragments... the network is an event, but not an object.
|
||||
|
||||
"We view data networks as a creative
|
||||
environment not to glorify the technological
|
||||
idea of progress, but to demystify the
|
||||
technologies of everyday life - to make them
|
||||
visible and to encourage productive use
|
||||
rather than consumption, so that we can
|
||||
responsibly utilize the considerable
|
||||
power that is within our reach."
|
||||
|
||||
The network can be an effective organizational form and, therefore, can easily become a space of capture - a totalitarian space. a space of diffuse forms of control.
|
||||
|
||||
the way of the monster, technologically inflated by power,
|
||||
co-opted into exploitation - whether or not
|
||||
whether we can reconcile repression or not, one in eight people on earth lives in slums, and the rest will be shuttled back and forth between the
|
||||
entertainment zone and the export /excort/ subsidy zone. ATV
|
||||
|
||||
and if the Net has the ability to "transform and mutate.”
|
||||
it is not autopoetic, though.
|
||||
Technology provides its own junctures, hence the name "material semiotics.”
|
||||
hence the name "material semiotics" (Donna Haraway).
|
||||
|
||||
where the technological means
|
||||
by which
|
||||
data are co-producers
|
||||
of meaning (B. Latour)
|
||||
|
||||
where the boundary
|
||||
of the "neurological turn" - an attempt
|
||||
cognitive mapping
|
||||
of our behavior via the Internet and the boundary of data collection policies and chosen alienation/ignorance from the introduction of networks into our everyday lives?
|
||||
|
||||
Who sponsors your department and your research?
|
||||
|
||||
.jpeg)
|
||||
|
||||
**OVERALL NUMBERS OF RUSSIA'S IMPORTS:**
|
||||
|
||||
(information collected from public sources)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue