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@ -40,52 +40,53 @@ A worldwide war condition blurs the distinction between war and non-war, where "
Despite the [apparent](https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-64630938) political autonomy of neighboring countries (former Soviet countries: [Armenia](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/18/business/economy/us-russia-chips-sanctions.html?ref=en.thebell.io), Kazakhstan, [Kyrgyzstan](https://en.odfoundation.eu/a/627027,russias-accomplices-in-the-war-against-ukraine-kazakhstan-and-kyrgyzstan-the-russian-armys-reliable-rear/#), Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Georgia, [Moldova](https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-64712252), etc.), russia [continues to use](https://eurasianet.org/russias-powerful-economic-levers-over-armenia) its territorial neighbors as a [transit zone to bypass the blockage](https://en.thebell.io/russias-big-sanctions-workaround/) of supplies of components for the military-industrial complex. The borders of sovereign territories are being re-drawn under the [pressure](https://informnapalm.org/en/advanced-russian-ew-system-navodchik-2-spotted-in-donbas-for-the-first-time/) of the diffuse space of the russian network of military contractors. Corrupt bypass routes for [shadow imports](https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-russia-tech-middlemen/) become [active](https://www.asiaplustj.info/ru/news/centralasia/20231111/kirgizstan-uzbekistan-i-rossiya-sozdayut-transportnii-koridor-v-obhod-kazahstana) and visible.
Shadow imports are necessary for russia to continue to replenish stocks and service the military-industrial complex.
[Shadow imports](https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/09/13/shesterenki-umiraiut-pervymi) are necessary for russia to continue to replenish stocks and service the military-industrial complex.
The russian military-industrial complex is not independent and critically depends on imported components.
The russian military-industrial complex [is not independent](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/collections/dd699cbf262947559a18e1a356f527b5?item=9) and critically [depends](https://informnapalm.org/en/how-companies-from-switzerland-italy-and-germany-help-russia-circumvent-sanctions-to-produce-weapons/) on [imported components](https://en.topwar.ru/190182-neprostoe-buduschee-rossijskih-udarnyh-bpla-o-prichinah-stagnacii-otrasli-zavisimosti-ot-importnyh-komplektujuschih-i-konceptualnom-tupike-nashih-dronov.html).
This is especially true for UAVs, secure communications, microelectronics, and machine tools for manufacturing parts.
This is especially true for [UAVs](https://informnapalm.org/en/russian-orlan-10-drone-jammed-by-ukrainian-electronic-warfare-assets/), [secure communications](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/alexey-evstifeev-9288b829_азарт-ангстрем-analogdevices-activity-7130575077061869568-5zz-), [microelectronics](https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/exclusive-russian-weapons-ukraine-powered-by-hundreds-western-parts-rusi-2022-08-08/), and machine tools for manufacturing parts.
The russian military-industrial complex is a direct successor of the soviet one. Over the past 30 years, very few new weapons have been put into serial production. The main focus of the russian military-industrial complex is on repair, support for the first, and modernization of what was produced during the USSR era. The new weapons samples under the russian outer shell consist of Western components at the level of engines, optics, processors, and microelectronics.
The russian military-industrial complex is a direct successor of the soviet one. Over the past 30 years, very few new weapons have been put into serial production. The main focus of the russian military-industrial complex is on repair, [support](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angstrem_(company)) for the first, and [modernization](https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5294399?from=doc_vrez) of what was produced during the USSR era. The new weapons samples under the russian outer shell consist of Western components at the level of engines, optics, [processors, and microelectronics](https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/ukraine-crisis-russia-missiles-chips/).
Contrary to myths about the impressive legacy of the soviet union, its own developments, and military production capacities, the russian military-industrial complex is a poorly coordinated, corrupt, and non-independent network of half-destroyed research institutes of the soviet period. Places, where import substitution of microelectronics and production methods takes place only on podiums in front of investors and in the weak imagination of officials, not existing in reality, the dynamics of the microelectronics industry and russian developments can be traced on the archived pages of the plant of Angstrem JSC ( moscow company engaged in the design and manufacture of electronic products and semiconductors. The company produced a number of Soviet-era integrated schemes. After the collapse of the USSR in the 90s, it produced a line of calculators and bank cards.) The plant, which was founded in 1963 under the name NII-336, and like the entire russian microelectronics industry, rapidly deteriorated after the collapse of the USSR 2.
[Contrary](https://finance.rambler.ru/markets/48525621-importozameschenie-po-kitayski/) to myths about the impressive legacy of the soviet union, its own developments, and military production capacities, the russian military-industrial complex is a poorly coordinated, corrupt, and [non-independent network](https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4465267.html) of half-destroyed research institutes of the soviet period. Places, where import substitution of microelectronics and production methods takes place only on podiums in front of investors and in the weak imagination of officials, [not existing in reality](https://habr.com/ru/articles/599671/), the dynamics of the microelectronics industry and russian developments can be traced on the archived pages of the plant of [Angstrem JSC](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angstrem_(company)) ( moscow company engaged in the design and manufacture of electronic products and semiconductors. The company produced a number of Soviet-era integrated schemes. After the collapse of the USSR in the 90s, it produced a line of calculators and bank cards.) The plant, which was founded in 1963 under the name NII-336, and like the entire russian microelectronics industry, [rapidly deteriorated after the collapse of the USSR](https://habr.com/ru/articles/660101/) 2.
2010: "The government will keep foreign parts out of defense products, cryptography, and passport systems To support russian microelectronics, the government agreed to provide local companies with orders, even if their products are more expensive than their foreign counterparts The government will support russian microelectronics" (c).
[2010](https://web.archive.org/web/20140828231107/http://www.angstrem.ru/angstrem-group/pressa/articles/articles_12.html): "The government will keep foreign parts out of defense products, cryptography, and passport systems To support russian microelectronics, the government agreed to provide local companies with orders, even if their products are more expensive than their foreign counterparts The government will support russian microelectronics" (c).
2010: "It makes no sense to create capacities for mass production of consumer electronics and electronic components with a low intellectual component, as the technological lag from the world leaders - the USA, Japan, Asia - is too great. There is nothing terrible in the fact that russia will continue to import from abroad electronics of mass demand - household appliances, TV sets, cell phones, GLONASS navigators, bank and trade cards, and other "colonial" goods (or to produce abroad for domestic consumption, but based on russian developments) - this is what all countries do today" (c).
[2010](https://web.archive.org/web/20140919083118/http://www.angstrem.ru/angstrem-group/pressa/articles/articles_14.html): "It makes no sense to create capacities for mass production of consumer electronics and electronic components with a low intellectual component, as the technological lag from the world leaders - the USA, Japan, Asia - is too great. There is nothing terrible in the fact that russia will continue to import from abroad electronics of mass demand - household appliances, TV sets, cell phones, GLONASS navigators, bank and trade cards, and other "colonial" goods (or to produce abroad for domestic consumption, but based on russian developments) - this is what all countries do today" (c).
2011: "Angstrem" started selling Huawei equipment.”
[2011](https://web.archive.org/web/20140828230723/http://www.angstrem.ru/angstrem-group/pressa/articles/articles_17.html): "Angstrem" started selling Huawei equipment.”
2011: "Vnesheconombank renewed Angstrem-T's credit line for 815 million euros. Former Communications Minister Leonid Reiman may have helped Angstrem-T reach an agreement with the bank.
[2011](https://web.archive.org/web/20140828233311/http://www.angstrem.ru/angstrem-group/pressa/articles/articles_18.html): "Vnesheconombank renewed Angstrem-T's credit line for 815 million euros. Former Communications Minister Leonid Reiman may have helped Angstrem-T reach an agreement with the bank.
Vnesheconombank's Supervisory Board has approved the resumption of financing for Angstrem-T, a source close to the Board told Vedomosti. The matter concerns a credit line for 815 million euros, which the bank allocated to this company in 2008 for the purchase of AMD licenses and equipment, as well as for the launch of a 0.13-0.11 micrometer microchip plant." (с)
2018: "U.S. sanctions targeting russia's nascent high-tech industry have caused a russian microchip company significant financial problems and delayed the launch of an initiative aimed at producing substitutes for Western products, the firm's owner said." President Vladimir Putin has emphasized the need to develop a domestic technology industry in russia to make it less dependent on Western equipment. But Moscow's efforts to produce russian microchips and other high-tech products have been hampered by U.S. sanctions against a number of russian technology companies. Angstrem-T, which makes semiconductors, has accumulated significant debts and is about to be taken over by state development bank VEB after failing to repay an 815 million euro loan."(c)
2019 Bankruptcy.
[2018](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/10/18/russian-high-tech-project-struggles-after-us-sanctions-a63217): "U.S. sanctions targeting russia's nascent high-tech industry have caused a russian microchip company significant financial problems and delayed the launch of an initiative aimed at producing substitutes for Western products, the firm's owner said." President Vladimir Putin has emphasized the need to develop a domestic technology industry in russia to make it less dependent on Western equipment. But Moscow's efforts to produce russian microchips and other high-tech products have been hampered by U.S. sanctions against a number of russian technology companies. Angstrem-T, which makes semiconductors, has accumulated significant debts and is about to be taken over by state development bank VEB after failing to repay an 815 million euro loan."(c)
2023 Angstrem is placed under state management under the decree on the state defense order, enters with GC Element, a joint venture between Rostekh and AFK Sistema, and Angstrem-T goes under the control of the state-owned VEB.RF corporation
[2019](https://habr.com/ru/news/473604/) Bankruptcy.
2023 disassembly into components by Ukrainian military experts: "Rashistka radio #Azart manufactured by #Angstrom. The radio contains five key #AnalogDevices chips." (c)
[2023](https://habr.com/ru/news/734754/) Angstrem is placed under state management under the decree on the state defense order, enters with GC Element, a joint venture between Rostekh and AFK Sistema, and Angstrem-T goes under the control of the state-owned VEB.RF corporation
What do we learn here about the global supply of components for the military-industrial complex, except about the helplessness and collapse of russia's domestic microelectronics industry? The US imposed sanctions on Angstrem-T in 2016 for the annexation of Crimea in 2014, but in 2023, Angstrem-T will use microchips made in the US.
[2023](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/alexey-evstifeev-9288b829_азарт-ангстрем-analogdevices-activity-7130575077061869568-5zz-) disassembly into components by Ukrainian military experts: "Rashistka radio #Azart manufactured by #Angstrom. The radio contains five key #AnalogDevices chips." (c)
What do we learn here about the global supply of components for the military-industrial complex, except about the helplessness and collapse of russia's domestic microelectronics industry? The US imposed sanctions on [Angstrem-T](https://www.linkedin.com/signup/cold-join?session_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.linkedin.com%2Ffeed%2Fhashtag%2FAuGAuTAuJAuXAuYAuWAuLAuS&trk=public_post-text) in 2016 for the annexation of Crimea in 2014, but in 2023, [Angstrem-T](https://www.linkedin.com/signup/cold-join?session_redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.linkedin.com%2Ffeed%2Fhashtag%2FAuGAuTAuJAuXAuYAuWAuLAuS&trk=public_post-text) will use microchips made in the US.
These details are also important because the Azart radio, assembled by Angstrem, is part of the Lorandit RP-377LR (radio-electronic reconnaissance) and REB (radio-electronic warfare) system, which is used in the war against Ukraine. That's being used in the war against Ukraine. RER and REB play key roles in combat, as they read UAV signals and interfere with the piloting course of enemy UAVs. That is, we realize that russian radio surveillance and radio warfare equipment are not without Western and Chinese manufacturers. At the same time, neither the U.S. nor the European countries provide lend-lease and aid to Ukraine.
russia does not have an extensive network of contractors for the military industry. Orders are distributed non-transparently within large holdings and corporations. Control over the fulfillment of orders is also hidden deep in the gut of an opaque but poorly coordinated machine. Since 2014, a network of foreign intermediary firms was registered and set up to supply components for the production of weapons. They, in turn, sent chips, microchips, etc., to military contractors - subsidiaries of the russian military-industrial complex, whose main enterprises were already under sanctions.
russia does not have an [extensive network](https://web.archive.org/web/20140828231107/http://www.angstrem.ru/angstrem-group/pressa/articles/articles_12.html) of contractors for the military industry. Orders are distributed non-transparently within [large holdings and corporations](https://habr.com/ru/news/734754/). Control over the fulfillment of orders is also hidden deep in the gut of an opaque but poorly coordinated machine. Since 2014, a network of foreign intermediary firms was registered and set up to supply components for the production of weapons. They, in turn, sent chips, microchips, etc., to military contractors - subsidiaries of the russian military-industrial complex, whose main enterprises were already under sanctions.
The sanctions boycott policies adopted in 2022 (and earlier in 2014) by the EU and a number of other countries no longer allow russia to obtain resources for direct warfare. However, the effect of sanctions 3 on military technology is severely weakened by the time lag, the merging of civilian and military technologies, and the enforced loyalty of the buffer countries that russia uses. Most importantly, russia continues to obtain components through old corrupt "business as a usual" relationships in European countries.
The sanctions boycott policies adopted in 2022 (and earlier in 2014) by the EU and a number of other countries no longer allow russia to obtain resources for direct warfare. However, the [effect of sanctions](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/10/18/russian-high-tech-project-struggles-after-us-sanctions-a63217) 3 on military technology is severely weakened by [the time lag](https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-targets-sanctions-circumvention-with-11th-package-against-russia-2023-06-23/), the merging of civilian and military technologies, and the [enforced](https://asiatimes.com/2023/07/kazakhstan-resisting-kyrgyz-pressure-to-break-russian-sanctions/) loyalty of the buffer countries that russia uses. Most importantly, russia continues to obtain [components](https://theins.ru/politika/264391) through [old corrupt](https://informnapalm.org/en/how-companies-from-switzerland-italy-and-germany-help-russia-circumvent-sanctions-to-produce-weapons/) "business as a usual" relationships in European countries.
Some military logistics have been restructured to focus on production in Iran, China, and Turkey. However, Western components produced in the EU and the U.S. enter russia via Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan.
Some military logistics have been restructured to focus on production in Iran, China, and Turkey. However, Western components produced in the EU and the U.S. [enter russia](https://www.ebrd.com/publications/working-papers/the-eurasian-roundabout?ref=en.thebell.io) via [Armenia](https://neweasterneurope.eu/2023/05/26/armenia-russias-backdoor-to-circumvent-sanctions/), [Kazakhstan](https://www.occrp.org/en/investigations/kazakhstan-has-become-a-pathway-for-the-supply-of-russias-war-machine-heres-how-it-works?fbclid=IwAR3K3YQcCzpMvISExCUCqkKbUouY0Tw7efqj9DCwHf75qjLZH1UiwGSfrWA), Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan.
Such cooperation and assistance in circumventing sanctions can hardly be called voluntary for the countries of the former USSR that share common borders with russia.
Human resources also play an important role in the colonial logic of warfare. Taking advantage of the pressure on the former soviet republics, russia promises russian passports to migrant workers from Central Asia for their participation in the war. In 2023, russia roundups and police raids on migrants who have obtained russian passports to serve them as military conscripts. External colonial logics are reflected in domestic politics: most of russia's army is made up of indigenous peoples, residents of national republics, and contract soldiers from economically disadvantaged regions. In Alabuga (Tatarstan), 15-year-olds are forcibly recruited to assemble Iranian Shahed combat drones for the needs of the russia army. The ideas of the "russian world" are paid for by those who were consistently exploited by the central regions and experienced genocides and ethnic cleansing by the empire.
Human resources also play an important role in the colonial logic of warfare. Taking advantage of the pressure on the former soviet republics, russia promises russian passports to migrant workers from Central Asia for their participation in the war. In 2023, russia [roundups and police raids on migrants](https://www.moscowtimes.nl/2023/08/24/vregionah-nachali-otlov-poluchivshih-grazhdanstvo-rfinostrantsev-dlya-vrucheniya-povestok-vvoenkomat-a52934) who have obtained russian passports to serve them as military conscripts. External colonial logics are reflected in domestic politics: most of russia's army is made up of indigenous peoples, residents of national republics, and contract soldiers from economically disadvantaged regions. In [Alabuga](https://polytech.alabuga.ru/) (Tatarstan), [15-year-olds are forcibly](https://storage.googleapis.com/istories/news/2023/07/24/studenti-dolzhni-stradat-v-tatarstanskom-kolledzhe-alabuga-studentov-massovo-privlekayut-k-sborke-dronov-shakhed-i-nakazivayut-za-otkaz-ot-raboti/index.html) recruited to assemble [Iranian Shahed](https://investigator.org.ua/ua/investigations/255650/?fbclid=IwAR1DRYcFfPqDyGVpEdCp3y-rhM4w0iOSnbgNiBQy8lIArrIwivifdf65H5w) combat drones for the needs of the russia army. The ideas of the "russian world" are paid for by those who were consistently exploited by the central regions and experienced genocides and ethnic cleansing by the empire.
We want to emphasize that the post-Soviet countries are deliberately used by russia, as the dependent quality of relations does not create conditions for symmetrical choices or the possibility of autonomous decision-making. In the example of Sakartvelo it is easy to trace the links of colonial pressure. Suffering 20% occupation of its territories by russia, Sakartvelo does not join the EU sanctions demands, despite the high level of internal solidarity of Sakartvelo residents towards Ukraine's struggle and despite the fact that Sakartvelo became a candidate for EU accession in 2023. There are many reasons for these apparent contradictions (threat of military intervention from russia, old corrupt ties between the countries, forced cross-border cooperation, transit deals, etc).
Also, the fact that many countries of post-soviet territories are linked to russia by forced labor migration plays a role in dependency relations. Migrant families are fragmented by labor-trade relations and forced linguistic-cultural integration in russia. And russian exploitative logics is the reason for this migration. Financial, scientific, educational, and cultural resources have been concentrated around the center ( moscow) without strengthening and developing local infrastructures, which makes people migrate for the missing flows in search of work, education, health care and better quality of life. The logics of capital and colonialism follow symmetrically, supporting each other.
Since the beginning of russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the borders of post-Soviet countries have been experiencing unrest and anxiety. Tensions have materialized into border military conflicts (Tajikistan-Uzbekistan, Armenia-Azerbaijan) and mass rallies demanding local authorities stop flirting with the Kremlin. (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Moldova).
Through external agents of influence, russia pressures and interferes in local elections, sabotaging paid rallies and riots. It threatens with economic pressure and cutting off access to energy resources, forcing neighboring countries into political deals loyal to itself.
Since the beginning of russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the borders of post-Soviet countries [have been experiencing unrest and anxiety](https://rus.ozodi.org/a/32081072.html). Tensions have materialized [into border](https://spektr.co/news/2023/09/02/vlasti-armenii-zayavili-ob-obhode-sankcij-rossiej-s-pomoschyu-turcii-i-azerbajdzhana/) military conflicts (Tajikistan-Uzbekistan, Armenia-Azerbaijan) and mass rallies demanding local authorities stop flirting with the Kremlin. (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Moldova).
Through external agents of influence, russia [pressures](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-intelligence-report-alleging-russia-election-interference-shared-with-100-2023-10-20/?ref=dron.media) and [interferes in local](https://www.dw.com/ru/razvedka-ssa-rossia-vmesivalas-v-vybory-kak-minimum-v-9-stranah/a-67170479) elections, sabotaging paid rallies and riots. It threatens with economic pressure and cutting off access to energy resources, forcing neighboring countries into political deals loyal to itself.
We see diffraction and plurality in the ideas of territorial independence and state sovereignty. Logistic flows furrow and redraw political and geographical maps, subjugating new territories and redefining them. The economic dependence and connectedness of the post-soviet space with the kremlin's central apparatus, subordinates the regional territories of russia in the logic of resource economy and encroaches on the fragile borders with neighboring states. Moscow is becoming a liquid and sticky matter, expanding its presence and extending its spheres of influence into more vulnerable regions on geographic or economic grounds.